

## Game theory

- Set of players
- (Normalized) game
- Gain guaranteed to the coalition  $A$
- Core of the game
- Shapley value
- Banzhaf value
- Normalized Banzhaf value

$$\Omega = \{1, \dots, n\}$$

$$\nu : \mathcal{P}(\Omega) \rightarrow [0, 1]$$

$$\nu(A)$$

$$\mathcal{M}(\nu) := \{P \text{ additive} : P(A) \geq \nu(A) \forall A\}$$

$$\Phi(\nu)(i) = \sum_{T \ni i} (\nu(T \cup \{i\}) - \nu(T)) (|T|!(n - |T| - 1)!)/n!$$

$$B(\nu)(i) = \sum_{T \ni i} (\nu(T \cup \{i\}) - \nu(T))/2^{n-1}$$


$$\Psi(\nu)(i) = B(\nu)(i) / \sum_{j=1}^n B(\nu)(j)$$

## Imprecise probabilities

- Set of values of a random variable  $X$
- Non-additive measure
- Lower probability of  $A$
- Credal set of  $\nu$
- Pignistic transformation (Smets)

### Questions:

- Is Shapley value the center of gravity (=average of the extreme points) of the core under more general conditions?
- Does it always belong to the core of the game?
- Does the (normalized) Banzhaf value make sense as a probability transformation?



### Essential references

- P. Baroni, P. Vicig, *An uncertainty interchange format with imprecise probabilities*. Int. J. of Approximate Reasoning, 2005.
- D. Dubois, H. Prade, *Unfair coins and necessity measures: towards a possibilistic interpretation of histograms*. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 1983.
- P. Smets, *Decision making in the TBM: the necessity of the pignistic transformation*. Int. J. of Approximate Reasoning, 2005.
- L. Shapley, *Cores of convex games*. Int. J. of Game Theory, 1971.

### At a glance

- Problem: studying game solutions as probability transformations.
- Idea: use the normalized Banzhaf value and Shapley value, and check if the latter is the center of gravity of the core in other conditions than for 2-monotone games.
- Results: they belong to the core in a number of cases, and can be given simpler expressions when  $\nu$  satisfies additional conditions.