

# Differences of Opinion

Dionissi Aliprantis  
Cleveland Fed

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


# Data and Beliefs

Is there solid evidence that the average temperature on earth has been getting warmer over the past few decades?


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
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
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Causal examples:

Neighborhoods affect employment.

Extending unemployment benefits increases unemployment.

Increasing the minimum wage increases unemployment.

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Directly-Observed Data + Model  $\implies$  Point-Valued Signal

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Weak Law of Large Numbers:

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_{it+1}^{k*} &= \frac{1}{t} \sum_{n=1}^t \sigma_{in}^{k*} \\ &= (1 - \delta_t) \lambda_{it}^{k*} + \delta_t \sigma_{it}^{k*} \quad \text{where} \quad \delta_t = 1/t \end{aligned}$$

For any  $\epsilon > 0$   $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \Pr(|\lambda_{it}^{k*} - E[\sigma_{it}^{k*}]| > \epsilon) = 0$

# Partial Identification

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
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- 1B) Infer missing data using info from social network  
This Paper

# Replicating Direct Observation


The Agent's Problem: Construct  $\hat{\sigma}_{it}^k = \sigma_{it}^{k*}$

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


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


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


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$\Rightarrow$  Given  $W_{it}$ ,  $\{\sigma_{jt}^k\}_{1,1}^{K,J}$ ,  $\{\lambda_{jt}^k\}_{1,1}^{K,J}$  choose  $\sigma_{jt}^k$  so that  $\hat{\sigma}_{it}^k = \sigma_{it}^{k*}$

Problem of Inference: Agent does not observe  $W_{jt}$  or  $\varphi_j^k$



# Linear Opinion Pooling $\implies$ DeGroot Updating

## Linear Opinion Pooling

$$\widehat{\sigma}_{it}^k = \theta_i^k \sigma_{it}^k + (1 - \theta_i^k) \sigma_{Jt}^k$$

$$\sigma_{Jt}^k = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}^k} w_{jt}^k \sigma_{jt}^k \quad \text{with } w_{jt}^k \geq 0 \quad \forall j \in \mathcal{J}^k, \quad \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}^k} w_{jt}^k = 1$$

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## DeGroot Updating if:

- 1 Entire network directly observes data once at  $t = 1$
- 2 Each agent sets  $\lambda_{i1}^k = \sigma_{i1}^k$
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## Solves the agent's problem if:

$$\mathbb{E}[\sigma_{it}^{k*}] = \mathbb{E}[\sigma_{jt}^k] \quad \forall j \in \mathcal{J}^k$$

What if sender  $j$ 's signals are "biased"?

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Solves the agent's problem if:

She has  $f^k \in \mathcal{F}$  such that  $\mathbb{E}[\sigma_{it}^{k*}] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{s}_{jt}^k] \quad \forall j \in \mathcal{J}^k$

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The Fundamental Problem of Inference

$\sigma_{it}^{k*}$  is never observed

Finding  $f^k \in \mathcal{F}$  is an Ill-Posed Problem

# One “Reasonable” Heuristic

$F(\sigma_{it}^{k*} - \sigma_{jt}^k)$  Is Driven by:

I (Random Sampling Error):  $\Gamma_i^* = \Gamma_j$

II (Biased Sampling Process):  $\Gamma_i^* \neq \Gamma_j$

III (Different Models):  $\varphi_i^k \neq \varphi_j^k$

IV (Social Influence):  $j$ 's model of social learning/network/etc.

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If (I)-(III) drive  $F(\sigma_{it}^{k*} - \sigma_{jt}^k) \Rightarrow \mathbb{E}[\lambda_{it}^{k*} - \lambda_{jt}^k] = \mathbb{E}[\sigma_{it}^{k*} - \sigma_{jt}^k] \Rightarrow$

$$s_{jt}^k = \sigma_{jt}^k + (\lambda_{it}^{k*} - \lambda_{jt}^k) \quad (\text{H1})$$

solves the agent's problem



# Assessing Heuristic Credibility

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## Relative Entropy of $\lambda_{it}^k - \lambda_{jt}^k$ over Propositions

Use to assign credibility weights  $w_{jt}^k$  to signals interpreted using  $\widehat{\text{HI}}$

Idea: Give more weight to senders that are better understood

Sethi and Yildiz (2016)

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$$s_{Jt}^k = \sum_{j=1}^{J^k} w_{jt}^k s_{jt}^k \quad \text{where} \quad w_{jt}^k = \frac{\Delta_{ijt}}{\sum_{j=1}^{J^k} \Delta_{ijt}} \quad \text{and}$$

$$Q_{ijt} \equiv f_k(\lambda_{it}^k - \lambda_{jt}^k)$$

$$\Delta_{ijt} \equiv \rho(D_{KL}(Q_{ijt} : U)) = [\gamma_1 D_{KL}(Q_{ijt} : U)]^{\gamma_2} \quad \text{where} \quad (\gamma_1, \gamma_2) = (100, 8)$$

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
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
Initial Beliefs:

$$\bar{\lambda}_{i1}^k \sim \begin{cases} \mathcal{N}(0.8, 0.1) & \text{if } i \in \mathcal{C}_1 \quad \forall k = 1, \dots, K & \text{card}(\mathcal{C}_1) = 100; \\ \mathcal{N}(0.2, 0.01) & \text{if } i \in \mathcal{C}_2 \quad \forall k = 1, \dots, K & \text{card}(\mathcal{C}_2) = 200. \end{cases}$$

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


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




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# Conclusion

## Well-motivated Rule of Thumb

- Optimizing Agent
  - Tension between direct and social observation
  - Imperfect communication  $\implies$  Inference problem
- Solution to replicate direct observation
  - Inductive assumptions are “scientific”

## Desirable Properties

- Tends to reach consensus (w/ DeGroot as a special case)
- Can generate non-degen dist of beliefs in steady state
  - Even when all have same model, directly-observe same data