

A TRANSFORMATION SYSTEM FOR UNIQUE MINIMAL NORMAL FORMS OF CONDITIONAL KNOWLEDGE BASES

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Logical Framework of Conditionals


Models for Conditionals and Knowledge Bases

A Transformation System for Conditional Knowledge Bases


Conclusion

Normal forms


MOTIVATION: WHY NORMAL FORMS?




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
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
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
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
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LOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF CONDITIONALS

We use a *standard propositional logic* with

- A finite propositional alphabet $\Sigma = \{V_1, \dots, V_m\}$,
- Usual logical connectives \wedge, \vee, \neg , and
- A language \mathcal{L} of literals from Σ closed under these connectives.

We represent the set of *possible worlds* Ω syntactically with complete conjunctions of literals of Σ .

Example (Possible Worlds)

Let $\Sigma = \{C, E, F\}$ be the alphabet with variables for car, e-car and fossil fuel. The possible worlds for this alphabet are:

$$\Omega = \{cef, cef\bar{f}, c\bar{e}f, c\bar{e}\bar{f}, \bar{c}ef, \bar{c}e\bar{f}, \bar{c}\bar{e}f, \bar{c}\bar{e}\bar{f}\}.$$

- *Conditionals* $(B|A)$ encode defeasible rules “*If A then usually B*”.
- Three-valued evaluation by worlds [Fin74]:

$$\llbracket (B|A) \rrbracket_{\omega} = \begin{cases} \textit{true} & \text{iff } \omega \models AB \quad (\text{“Rule verified”}) \\ \textit{false} & \text{iff } \omega \models A\bar{B} \quad (\text{“Rule violated”}) \\ \textit{undefined} & \text{iff } \omega \models \bar{A} \quad (\text{“Rule not applicable”}) \end{cases}$$

- Sets of conditionals $\mathcal{R} = \{(B_1|A_1), \dots, (B_n|A_n)\}$ are called *(conditional) knowledge bases*.

Example (Conditionals)

$(f|c)$: “Usually cars need fossil fuel.”

$(\bar{f}|e)$: “Usually e-cars do not need fossil fuel.”

$(c|e)$: “Usually e-cars are cars.”

MODELS FOR CONDITIONALS AND KNOWLEDGE BASES

To give appropriate *semantics to conditionals*, they are usually considered within *richer structures* such as *epistemic states*.

Typical Models of Conditionals:

Quantitative

Probabilistic

P accepts $(B|A)$ iff
 $P((B|A)) = P(B|A)$
“The Equation”.

$$P \models (B|A)$$

Qualitative

Possibilistic

Π accepts $(B|A)$ iff
verification of $(B|A)$
more *possible* than
falsification of $(B|A)$

$$\Pi \models (B|A)$$

Plausibilistic

κ accepts $(B|A)$ iff
verification of $(B|A)$
more *plausible* than
falsification of $(B|A)$

$$\kappa \models (B|A)$$

To give appropriate *semantics to conditionals*, they are usually considered within *richer structures* such as *epistemic states*.

Typical Models of Conditionals:

Qualitative

Plausibilistic
κ accepts $(B A)$ iff verification of $(B A)$ more <i>plausible</i> than falsification of $(B A)$
$\kappa \models (B A)$

ORDINAL CONDITIONAL FUNCTIONS (OCF)

An Ordinal Conditional Function (OCF) or *ranking function* κ is a function that assigns a *degree of disbelief* to each world $\omega \in \Omega$.

Definition (OCF [Spohn '88])

$\kappa := \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0^\infty$ such that:

$$\kappa^{-1}(0) \neq \emptyset$$

$$\kappa(\mathbf{A}) = \min\{\kappa(\omega) \mid \omega \models \mathbf{A}\}$$

$$\kappa(\mathbf{B} \mid \mathbf{A}) = \kappa(\mathbf{AB}) - \kappa(\mathbf{A})$$

$$\kappa \models (\mathbf{B} \mid \mathbf{A}) \text{ iff } \kappa(\mathbf{AB}) < \kappa(\mathbf{A}\bar{\mathbf{B}})$$

Example (Car Ranking)

$\bar{c}ef$	$\kappa(\omega) = 4$
$cef, \bar{c}e\bar{f}$	$\kappa(\omega) = 2$
$ce\bar{f}, c\bar{e}\bar{f}$	$\kappa(\omega) = 1$
$c\bar{e}\bar{f}, \bar{c}\bar{e}\bar{f}, \bar{c}\bar{e}f$	$\kappa(\omega) = 0$

For knowledge bases we have $\kappa \models \mathcal{R}$ iff $\kappa \models (\mathbf{B} \mid \mathbf{A})$ for all $(\mathbf{B} \mid \mathbf{A}) \in \mathcal{R}$.

Classical and conditional models and equivalence

- A *model* of *formula* is a *world* in which the *formula* is *satisfied*.

Classical and conditional models and equivalence

- A *model* of *conditional* is an *epistemic state* in which the *conditional* is *accepted*.

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- A *formula* is *equivalent* to another *formula* iff both have identical *models*.

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- A *conditional* is *equivalent* to another *conditional* iff both have identical *models*.

Example

For instance, $\{(B|A)\} \equiv \{(BA|A)\}$

Two conditional knowledge bases \mathcal{R} and \mathcal{R}' are

- *Elementwise equivalent* iff
each conditional in \mathcal{R}
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- *Elementwise equivalent* iff
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- *Modelwise equivalent* iff
they have the same models, i.e.,
 $\kappa \models \mathcal{R}$ iff $\kappa \models \mathcal{R}'$.

A TRANSFORMATION SYSTEM FOR CONDITIONAL KNOWLEDGE BASES

Intuitively, redundant information should be removed by a normalization, so, let, for instance,

$$\mathcal{R} = \left\{ \begin{array}{llll} r_1 = (f|c), & r_2 = (\bar{f}|e), & r_3 = (c|e), & r_4 = (e|e\bar{f}), \\ r_5 = (e\bar{f}|e), & r_6 = (\bar{e}|\top), & r_7 = (cf \vee \bar{c}\bar{f}|ce \vee c\bar{e}) \end{array} \right\}$$

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$$\mathcal{R} \xrightarrow{\text{(normalize)}} \{r_1, r_3, r_4, r_5, r_6, r_7\}, \text{ since } e\bar{f} \equiv ee\bar{f}$$

TRANSFORMATION SYSTEM \mathcal{T} (INTUITION)

Define a transformation System \mathcal{T} with rules τ such that

- $\tau(\mathcal{R})$ contains information *equivalent* to \mathcal{R} .
- \mathcal{T} is *terminating*
(i.e. there is a fixed point Q s.t. $\mathcal{T}^Q(\mathcal{R}) = \mathcal{T}^{Q+1}(\mathcal{T})$).
- Order of rules application is irrelevant (*confluence*).
- \mathcal{T} is *minimizing*¹ (i.e. $|\mathcal{R}| \leq |\mathcal{T}(\mathcal{R})|$).

Then $\mathcal{T}^Q(\mathcal{R}) = \mathcal{T}(\mathcal{R})$ is a normal form of \mathcal{R} .

¹With respect to given semantics

TRANSFORMATION SYSTEM \mathcal{T} (RULES)

(SF)	self-fulfilling	$\frac{\mathcal{R} \cup \{(B A)\}}{\mathcal{R}}$	$A \models B, A \not\models \perp$
(DP)	duplicate	$\frac{\mathcal{R} \cup \{(B A), (B' A')\}}{\mathcal{R} \cup \{(B A)\}}$	$A \equiv A', B \equiv B'$
(CE)	conditional equivalence	$\frac{\mathcal{R} \cup \{(B A), (B' A')\}}{\mathcal{R} \cup \{(B A)\}}$	$AB \equiv A'B', A\bar{B} \equiv A'\bar{B}'$
(PN)	propositional normal form	$\frac{\mathcal{R} \cup \{(B A)\}}{\mathcal{R} \cup \{(\nu(B) \nu(A))\}}$	$A \neq \nu(A), B \neq \nu(B)$
(CN)	conditional normal form	$\frac{\mathcal{R} \cup \{(B A)\}}{\mathcal{R} \cup \{(\nu(AB) \nu(A))\}}$	$B \neq AB$
(CC)	counter conditional	$\frac{\mathcal{R} \cup \{(B A), (\bar{B} A)\}}{\diamond}$	
(SC)	self contradictory	$\frac{\mathcal{R} \cup \{(B A)\}}{\diamond}$	$AB \equiv \perp$
(IC)	inconsistency	$\frac{\mathcal{R} \cup \{(B A)\}}{\diamond}$	$\mathcal{R} \neq \diamond, \Pi(\mathcal{R}) = \diamond$

TRANSFORMATION SYSTEM \mathcal{T} (EXAMPLE)

Applying \mathcal{T} , the conditional knowledge base

$$\mathcal{R} = \left\{ \begin{array}{llll} r_1 = (f|c), & r_2 = (\bar{f}|e), & r_3 = (c|e), & r_4 = (e|e\bar{f}), \\ r_5 = (e\bar{f}|e), & r_6 = (\bar{e}|\top), & r_7 = (cf \vee \bar{c}\bar{f}|ce \vee c\bar{e}) \end{array} \right\}$$

is normalized to

$$\mathcal{R} = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} r_1 = (f|c), & r_3 = (c|e), \\ r_5 = (e\bar{f}|e), & r_6 = (\bar{e}|\top), \end{array} \right\}$$

Proposition

The transformation system \mathcal{T} is

- **terminating.**
- **confluent.**
- **correct.**
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Adding a rule that removes conditionals r_i that are System P entailable from $\mathcal{R} \setminus \{r_i\}$ gives us the property *minimizing* for model equivalence, with this we lose confluence.

CONCLUSION

Two types of equivalence for conditional knowledge bases

- *Via models*, like in propositional logic
(Different model types possible, here: *OCF*)
 - *Elementwise* via models of conditionals or
 - *Modelwise* via models of conditional knowledge bases

Normal form for conditional knowledge base

- Set of model preserving rules \rightarrow *transformation system* \mathcal{T} .
- (*Minimizing*)², *terminating, correct, confluent*.

$\Rightarrow \mathcal{T}(\mathcal{R})$ is a (canonical)² normal form of \mathcal{R} .

²wrt elementwise equivalence

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Thank you for your attention.

²wrt elementwise equivalence



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