

A first-order logic for reasoning about higher-order upper and lower probabilities

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1 Previous work on this topic

- Halpern and Pucella's Paper
- Our previous work

2 The Logic \mathcal{L}_{lu}

- Syntax and Semantics
- Axiomatization and Strong Completeness

1 Previous work on this topic


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
- Syntax and Semantics
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Halpern, J. Y., Pucella, R.: A Logic for Reasoning about Upper Probabilities. *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research*, 17: 5781 (2002)

Example




Example



Set of probabilities $P = \{\mu_\alpha \mid \alpha \in [0, 0.7]\}$, where μ_α gives green-event probability 0.3, blue-event probability α , and red-event probability $0.7 - \alpha$.


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$$P_*(X) = \inf\{\mu(X) \mid \mu \in P\}$$

Example




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
$$P_*(X) = \inf\{\mu(X) \mid \mu \in P\}$$

$$P^*(X) = \sup\{\mu(X) \mid \mu \in P\}$$

Example




Example




$$P_{\star}(R) = 0,$$

Example




$$P_{\star}(R) = 0, \quad P^{\star}(R) = 0.7,$$

Example




$$P_{\star}(R) = 0, \quad P^{\star}(R) = 0.7, \quad P_{\star}(B) = 0,$$

Example



$$P_{\star}(R) = 0, \quad P^{\star}(R) = 0.7, \quad P_{\star}(B) = 0, \quad P^{\star}(B) = 0.7,$$

Example



$$P_{\star}(R) = 0, \quad P^{\star}(R) = 0.7, \quad P_{\star}(B) = 0, \quad P^{\star}(B) = 0.7, \\ P_{\star}(G) = P^{\star}(G) = 0.3.$$

Those two functions are related by the formula $P_{\star}(X) = 1 - P^{\star}(X^c)$.

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A basic likelihood formulas:

$$\theta_1 I(\varphi_1) + \dots + \theta_k I(\varphi_k) \geq c,$$

where $c, \theta_i \in \mathbb{R}$, φ_i are propositional formulas $i = 1, \dots, k$.
 I is an upper probability operator

Theorem (Anger and Lembcke 1985)

Let W be a set, H an algebra of subsets of W , and f a function $f : H \rightarrow [0, 1]$. There exists a set P of probability measures such that $f = P^*$ iff f satisfies the following three properties:

- (1) $f(\emptyset) = 0$,
- (2) $f(W) = 1$,
- (3) for all natural numbers m, n, k and all subsets A_1, \dots, A_m in H , if the multiset $\{\{A_1, \dots, A_m\}\}$ is an (n, k) -cover of (A, W) , then $k + nf(A) \leq \sum_{i=1}^m f(A_i)$.

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Definition ((n, k) -cover)

A set A is said to be covered n times by a multiset $\{\{A_1, \dots, A_m\}\}$ of sets if every element of A appears in at least n sets from A_1, \dots, A_m , i.e., for all $x \in A$, there exists i_1, \dots, i_n in $\{1, \dots, m\}$ such that for all $j \leq n$, $x \in A_{i_j}$. An (n, k) -cover of (A, W) is a multiset $\{\{A_1, \dots, A_m\}\}$ that covers W k times and covers A $n + k$ times.

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Instead of using linear combinations...


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
Instead of using linear combinations...

Classical propositional logic + operators $L_{\geq s}$ and $U_{\geq s}$, $s \in \mathbb{Q} \cap [0, 1]$.

Example




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
$$L=0R, L=0B;$$

Example



$$L_{=0}R, L_{=0}B; \quad U_{=0.7}R, U_{=0.7}B$$

Example



$$L_{=0}R, L_{=0}B; \quad U_{=0.7}R, U_{=0.7}B$$

$$((U_{\leq 0.3}G \wedge L_{\geq 0.3}G) \wedge U_{\leq 0.2}R) \Rightarrow L_{\geq 0.5}B.$$

Definition (*LUPP*-structure)

$M = \langle W, H, P, v \rangle$, where:

- W is a nonempty set of *worlds*.
- H is an algebra of subsets of W .
- P is a set of finitely additive probability measures defined on H .
- $v : W \times \mathcal{L} \rightarrow \{true, false\}$ evaluations of the primitive propositions.

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Definition (Satisfiability relation)

- $M \models \alpha$ iff $v(w)(\alpha) = true$, for all $w \in W$,
- $M \models U_{\geq s} \alpha$ iff $P^*([\alpha]) \geq s$,
- $M \models L_{\geq s} \alpha$ iff $P_*([\alpha]) \geq s$.

- (1) all instances of the classical propositional tautologies
- (2) $U_{\leq 1}\alpha \wedge L_{\leq 1}\alpha$
- (3) $U_{\leq r}\alpha \rightarrow U_{< s}\alpha, s > r$
- (4) $U_{< s}\alpha \rightarrow U_{\leq s}\alpha$
- (5) $(U_{\leq r_1}\alpha_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge U_{\leq r_m}\alpha_m) \rightarrow U_{\leq r}\alpha$, if
 $\alpha \rightarrow \bigvee_{J \subseteq \{1, \dots, m\}, |J|=k+n} \bigwedge_{j \in J} \alpha_j$ and $\bigvee_{J \subseteq \{1, \dots, m\}, |J|=k} \bigwedge_{j \in J} \alpha_j$ are
propositional tautologies, where $r = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^m r_i - k}{n}$, $n \neq 0$
- (6) $\neg(U_{\leq r_1}\alpha_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge U_{\leq r_m}\alpha_m)$, if $\bigvee_{J \subseteq \{1, \dots, m\}, |J|=k} \bigwedge_{j \in J} \alpha_j$ is a
propositional tautology and $\sum_{i=1}^m r_i < k$
- (7) $L_{=1}(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow (U_{\geq s}\alpha \rightarrow U_{\geq s}\beta)$

Inference Rules

- (1) From ρ and $\rho \rightarrow \sigma$ infer σ
- (2) From α infer $L_{\geq 1}\alpha$
- (3) From the set of premises

$$\{\phi \rightarrow U_{\geq s - \frac{1}{k}}\alpha \mid k \geq \frac{1}{s}\}$$

infer $\phi \rightarrow U_{\geq s}\alpha$

- (4) From the set of premises

$$\{\phi \rightarrow L_{\geq s - \frac{1}{k}}\alpha \mid k \geq \frac{1}{s}\}$$

infer $\phi \rightarrow L_{\geq s}\alpha$.

Comparison of these two logics

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Halpern and Pucella's Logic for Reasoning about Upper Probabilities

- Uncountable Language
- Finitary axiomatization
- (Weak) completeness

Our Logic with Upper and Lower Probability Operators

- Countable Language
- Infinitary axiomatization
- Strong completeness

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Construct the logic that will have the language powerful enough to express:

- $U_{\leq \frac{9}{10}}^a \text{Rain}(C)$

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- $L_{\geq 0.1}^a U_{\leq 0.9}^b \text{Rain}(C)$

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- $L_{\geq \frac{1}{3}}^a (\forall x) Rain(x)$

Construct the logic that will have the language powerful enough to express:

- $U_{\leq \frac{9}{10}}^a \text{Rain}(C)$
- $L_{\geq 0.1}^a U_{\leq 0.9}^b \text{Rain}(C)$
- $L_{\geq \frac{1}{3}}^a (\forall x) \text{Rain}(x)$
- $(\exists x) U_{=0}^a \text{Rain}(x).$

Let $S = \mathbb{Q} \cap [0, 1]$, $Var = \{x, y, z, \dots\}$ be a denumerable set of variables and let $\Sigma = \{a, b, \dots\}$ be a finite, non-empty set of agents. The language of the logic \mathcal{L}_{lu} consists of:

- the elements of set Var ,
- classical propositional connectives \neg and \wedge ,
- universal quantifier \forall ,
- for every integer $k \geq 0$, denumerably many function symbols F_0^k, F_1^k, \dots of arity k ,
- for every integer $k \geq 0$, denumerably many relation symbols P_0^k, P_1^k, \dots of arity k ,
- the list of upper probability operators $U_{\geq s}^a$, for every $s \in S$,
- the list of lower probability operators $L_{\geq s}^a$, for every $s \in S$,
- comma, parentheses.

Definition (Formula)

The set $For_{\mathcal{L}_{lu}}$ of formulas is the smallest set containing atomic formulas and that is closed under following formation rules: if α, β are formulas, then $L_{\geq s}^a \alpha$, $U_{\geq s}^a \alpha$, $\neg \alpha$, $\alpha \wedge \beta$, $(\forall x)\alpha$ are formulas as well. The formulas from $For_{\mathcal{L}_{lu}}$ will be denoted by α, β, \dots

We use the following abbreviations to introduce other types of inequalities:

- $U_{< s}^a \alpha$ is $\neg U_{\geq s}^a \alpha$, $U_{\leq s}^a \alpha$ is $L_{\geq 1-s}^a \neg \alpha$, $U_{=s}^a \alpha$ is $U_{\leq s}^a \alpha \wedge U_{\geq s}^a \alpha$, $U_{> s}^a \alpha$ is $\neg U_{\leq s}^a \alpha$,
- $L_{< s}^a \alpha$ is $\neg L_{\geq s}^a \alpha$, $L_{\leq s}^a \alpha$ is $U_{\geq 1-s}^a \neg \alpha$, $L_{=s}^a \alpha$ is $L_{\leq s}^a \alpha \wedge L_{\geq s}^a \alpha$, $L_{> s}^a \alpha$ is $\neg L_{\leq s}^a \alpha$.

Definition (\mathcal{L}_{lu} -structure)

An \mathcal{L}_{lu} -structure is a tuple $\mathcal{M} = \langle W, D, I, LUP \rangle$, where:

- W is a nonempty set of *worlds*,
- D associates a non-empty domain $D(w)$ with every world $w \in W$,
- I associates an interpretation $I(w)$ with every world $w \in W$ such that:
 - $I(w)(F_i^k) : D(w)^k \rightarrow D(w)$, for all i and k ,
 - $I(w)(P_i^k) \subseteq D(w)^k$, for all i and k ,
- LUP assigns, to every $w \in W$ and every agent $a \in \Sigma$, a space, such that $LUP(a, w) = \langle W(a, w), H(a, w), P(a, w) \rangle$, where:
 - $\emptyset \neq W(a, w) \subseteq W$,
 - $H(a, w)$ is an algebra of subsets of $W(a, w)$, i.e. a set of subsets of $W(a, w)$ such that:
 - $W(a, w) \in H(a, w)$,
 - if $A, B \in H(a, w)$, then $W(a, w) \setminus A \in H(a, w)$ and $A \cup B \in H(a, w)$,
 - $P(a, w)$ is a set of finitely additive probability measures defined on $H(a, w)$

Definition

The truth value of a formula α in a world $w \in W$:

- if $\alpha = P_i^m(t_1, \dots, t_m)$, then $I(w)(\alpha)_v = \text{true}$ if $\langle I(w)(t_1)_v, \dots, I(w)(t_m)_v \rangle \in I(w)(P_i^m)$, otherwise $I(w)(\alpha)_v = \text{false}$,
- if $\alpha = \neg\beta$, then $I(w)(\alpha)_v = \text{true}$ if $I(w)(\beta)_v = \text{false}$, otherwise $I(w)(\alpha)_v = \text{false}$,
- if $\alpha = \beta \wedge \gamma$, then $I(w)(\alpha)_v = \text{true}$ if $I(w)(\beta)_v = \text{true}$ and $I(w)(\gamma)_v = \text{true}$,
- if $\alpha = U_{\geq s}^a \beta$, then $I(w)(\alpha)_v = \text{true}$ if $P^*(w, a) \{u \in W(w, a) \mid I(u)(\beta)_v = \text{true}\} \geq s$, otherwise $I(w)(\alpha)_v = \text{false}$,
- if $\alpha = L_{\geq s}^a \beta$, then $I(w)(\alpha)_v = \text{true}$ if $P_*(w, a) \{u \in W(w, a) \mid I(u)(\beta)_v = \text{true}\} \geq s$, otherwise $I(w)(\alpha)_v = \text{false}$,
- if $\alpha = (\forall x)\beta$, then $I(w)(\alpha)_v = \text{true}$ if for every $d \in D(w)$, $I(w)(\beta)_{v_w[d/x]} = \text{true}$, otherwise $I(w)(\alpha)_v = \text{false}$.

We will consider a class of \mathcal{L}_{lu} models that satisfy:

- all the worlds from a model have the same domain, i.e., for all $v, w \in W$, $D(v) = D(w)$,
- for every sentence α , for every agent $a \in \Sigma$ and every world w from a model \mathcal{M} , the set $\{u \in W(w, a) \mid I(u)(\alpha)_v = \text{true}\}$ of all worlds from $W(w, a)$ that satisfy α is measurable,
- the terms are rigid, i.e., for every model their meanings are the same in all the worlds.

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Axiom schemes

- (1) all instances of the classical propositional tautologies
- (2) $(\forall x)(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow (\alpha \rightarrow (\forall x)\beta)$, where the variable x does not occur free in α
- (3) $(\forall x)\alpha(x) \rightarrow \alpha(t)$, where $\alpha(t)$ is obtained by substitution of all free occurrences of x in the first-order formula $\alpha(x)$ by the term t which is free for x in $\alpha(x)$
- (4) $U_{\leq 1}^a \alpha \wedge L_{\leq 1}^a \alpha$
- (5) $U_{\leq r}^a \alpha \rightarrow U_{< s}^a \alpha$, $s > r$
- (6) $U_{< s}^a \alpha \rightarrow U_{\leq s}^a \alpha$
- (7) $(U_{\leq r_1}^a \alpha_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge U_{\leq r_m}^a \alpha_m) \rightarrow U_{\leq r}^a \alpha$, if $\alpha \rightarrow \bigvee_{J \subseteq \{1, \dots, m\}, |J|=k+n} \bigwedge_{j \in J} \alpha_j$ and $\bigvee_{J \subseteq \{1, \dots, m\}, |J|=k} \bigwedge_{j \in J} \alpha_j$ are tautologies, where $r = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^m r_i - k}{n}$, $n \neq 0$
- (8) $\neg(U_{\leq r_1}^a \alpha_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge U_{\leq r_m}^a \alpha_m)$, if $\bigvee_{J \subseteq \{1, \dots, m\}, |J|=k} \bigwedge_{j \in J} \alpha_j$ is a tautology and $\sum_{i=1}^m r_i < k$
- (9) $L_{=1}^a (\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow (U_{\geq s}^a \alpha \rightarrow U_{\geq s}^a \beta)$

Inference Rules

- (1) From α and $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ infer β
- (2) From α infer $(\forall x)\alpha$
- (3) From α infer $L_{\geq 1}^a \alpha$
- (4) From the set of premises

$$\left\{ \alpha \rightarrow U_{\geq s - \frac{1}{k}}^a \beta \mid k \geq \frac{1}{s} \right\}$$

$$\text{infer } \alpha \rightarrow U_{\geq s}^a \beta$$

- (5) From the set of premises

$$\left\{ \alpha \rightarrow L_{\geq s - \frac{1}{k}}^a \beta \mid k \geq \frac{1}{s} \right\}$$

$$\text{infer } \alpha \rightarrow L_{\geq s}^a \beta.$$

Definition (Canonical model)

A canonical model $\mathcal{M}_{Can} = \langle W, D, I, LUP \rangle$ is a tuple such that:

- W is the set of all saturated sets of formulas,
- D is the set of all variable-free terms,
- for every $w \in W$, $I(w)$ is an interpretation such that:
 - for every function symbol F_i^m , $I(w)(F_i^m) : D^m \rightarrow D$ such that for all variable-free terms t_1, \dots, t_m ,
 $I(w)(F_i^m) : \langle t_1, \dots, t_m \rangle \mapsto F_i^m(t_1, \dots, t_m)$,
 - for every relation symbol P_i^m ,
 $I(w)(P_i^m) = \{ \langle t_1, \dots, t_m \rangle \mid P_i^m(t_1, \dots, t_m) \in w \}$, for all variable-free terms t_1, \dots, t_m ,
- for every $a \in \Sigma$ and every $w \in W$,
 $LUP(w, a) = \langle W(w, a), H(w, a), P(w, a) \rangle$ is defined:
 - $W(w, a) = W$,
 - $H(w, a) = \{ \{ u \mid u \in W(w, a), \alpha \in u \} \mid \alpha \in For_{\mathcal{L}_{lu}} \}$,
 - $P(w, a)$ is any set of probability measures such that
 $P^*(w, a)(\{ u \mid u \in W(w, a), \alpha \in u \}) = \sup \{ s \mid U_{\geq s}^a \alpha \in w \}$.

Definition

Set of formulas T is *saturated* if it is maximally consistent and satisfies:
if $\neg(\forall x)\alpha(x) \in T$, then for some term t , $\neg\alpha(t) \in T$.

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Theorem (Lindenbaum's theorem)

Every consistent set of formulas can be extended to a saturated set.

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Theorem (Lindenbaum's theorem)

Every consistent set of formulas can be extended to a saturated set.

Theorem (Strong completeness)

Every consistent set of formulas T is satisfiable.

-  Anger, B., Lembcke, J.: Infinitely subadditive capacities as upper envelopes of measures. *Zeitschrift für Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und Verwandte Gebiete*, 68: 403–414. (1985)
-  Halpern, J. Y., Pucella, R.: A Logic for Reasoning about Upper Probabilities. *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research*, 17: 57–81 (2002)
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